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Peters: Developments in the Doctrine of Carper v. United Fuel Gas Company

OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF CARPER v.
UNITED FUEL GAS COMPANY
The United States Supreme Court in a strong decision has
reversed the Sauder case,' heretofore discussed in this Quarterly.!
The effect of the final decision is to declare that an oil and gas
lessee cannot, after drilling a few off-set wells on a very small portion of the leased land, hold the rest of the tract indefinitely without any attempt at production, despite his contention that
geological information indicates that this remaining portion could
not be developed profitably. This effect is reached by the court's
holding that the lessee's leaving the greater portion of the land
idle, for seventeen years here, is a breach of the so-called implied
covenant of diligent development, for which breach the lessor is
entitled to cancellation of the lease as to the undeveloped portion.
This decision is one of the very few by the United States
Supreme Court which directly decides an important problem of
oil and gas law.8 Thus the fact that such a decision has been rendered invites attention to the present status in West Virginia of
the oil and gas law on the question of the respective rights of
lessor and lessee as those rights are affected by the implying of
covenants and conditions in the oil and gas lease. And the
determination of these rights in West Virginia to-day will depend
upon a re-examination of the leading case of Carper v. United
,Fuel Gas Company," with a view to ascertaining to what extent
the doctrine of that case obtains in the jurisdiction at the present
time.
In order that the problem of the Carper case may be fully
appreciated and its result fully understood, it is necessary to examine for a moment the nature of the rights of the parties to an
oil and gas lease. There is a relational obligation between the
'Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 S. Ct. 671 (1934).
The
Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion is Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Sauder,
67 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
2 The effect of the Circuit Court of Appeals' decision on oil and gas development is discussed in Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 175; the effect of it
as a Swift v. Tyson decision is the subject of a note in (1934) 40 W. VA.

L. Q. 258.

OThe only other important oil and gas case from the Supreme Court is
Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 35 S. Ct. 526 (1915), concerning the granting
of an injunction against destruction of an oil leasehold.
'78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916) L. R. A. 1917A 171.
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lessor and lessee of an oil and gas lease, although, strictly speaking, the relation of landlord and tenant does not obtain.' Then,
as to the duty of the lessee to develop the land under a drill or
pay clause or an "unless" clause,' there were two possible results
for the courts to reach in the constructipn of leases containing
such a clause. They could construe an implied covenant to drill,
for breach of which the lessor would have an action at law for
damages against the lessee for breach of the covenant, or a suit in
equity for specific performance of the covenant.
On the other
hand, the courts could construe an implied condition to drill, in
which case the relief would be a suit for cancellation of the lease
because of breach of the condition. Up until 1916 the law in West
Virginia on the point was very unsettled, with the courts using
the terms "covenant" and "condition" seemingly indiscriminately.'
Then in 1916 the Carper decision was rendered, in which the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia chose to consider the
duty to drill an implied condition rather than a covenant. It is
submitted that the reasoning of the court in concluding to adopt
that construction is sound, namely, that it is less onerous to the
lessee while still affording the lessor adequate protection."
After this definite stand had been taken by the West Virginia court on the point, the oil and gas law of the state ran a
more settled course. The cases of Stanley v. United Fuel Gas
Company" and Chambers v. Perrine followed closely on the heels
of the Carper case, citing it as a very important precedent, approving it wholeheartedly and adopting its doctrine in toto. The
first even slight criticism of the Carper case appeared in a dictum
I See Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., supra n. 4, 439 ff. Also, as to the
nature of the relationship between oil and gas lessor and lesser, see SumrERs,
Om AND GAs (1927) 154 if. The oil and gas "lease" is in actuality the
giving of a profit a prendre.
'A clause whereby the lessee covenants to drill within a certain specified
time or to pay delay rentals in lieu of drilling. As to the general effect of
these clauses, see SummERs, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 330 ff.
See Note (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 248, discussing this unsettled condition
of the law prior to the Carper decision and also the effect of that decision.
' See the language in the opinion, supra n. 4, at 441 and 442, also the
syllabi 3 and 6. The court still talks about a "conditional covenant" in
some places, however. See pages 436 and 437.
'The court was undoubtedly influenced by the realization that to hold to
the opposite construction would spell virtual ruin to the oil and gas industry
of the state, as the producing companies would soon be bankrupt if they
were compelled to drill wells on all leased lands, many of which would not
be sufciently productive to pay for the very high expense of sinking a well.
Of course, the "surrender" clause would be some protection.
1078 W. Va. 793, 90 S. E. 344 (1916).
"181 W. Va. 321, 94 S.E. 381 (1917).
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in the case of Carbon Black Company v. Gillespie' in 1920, in a
statement rather forced by the petition for rehearing, and in the
circumstances the statement does not at all weaken the authority
of the Carper case.' The case of Lamp v. Locke1' in the following
year should be mentioned in passing, as there a mandatory injunction was granted to compel the lessee to drill an off-set well; the
case is clearly distinguishable from the Carper case, however, as
the suit was brought by one not a party to the lease, but merely a
joint owner of the royalties, and there was no other remedy to be
given, as there was no chance of changing a forfeiture over the
lessee's head since the lessor was in collusion with the lessee in
the fraudulent drainage scheme.'
The Carper case is cited again
in 1923 in United Fuel Gas Company v. Smith," but the case at
hand is distinguished from the fact situation of the Carper case.
Finally comes the case of Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Company"
in 1933 followed by that of Dillard 'v. United Fuel Gas Company'
in 1934, which set the limitation on the Carper doctrine that it is
to be applied only to situations of non-fraudulent drainage, stat87 W. Va. 441, 105 S. E. 517 (1920).
3The Carper case was not mentioned in the original opinion, doubtless
because it was not directly in point. The facts of the Gillespie case were
simply not strong enough for a forfeiture, as the lessee was merely
contended to have failed to exercise a "high degree" of diligence in the
development of the property, and have failed to use the method of operation
most likely to produce the stipulated amounts of gas, but he had been "reasonablyly diligent and operated in a manner consistent with usage and custom and his duty to the lessor. But evidently because it was strongly relied
upon by the briefs on the petition for rehearing, the court added this statement to its opinion in refusing the petition for rehearing: "The conclusion
that breach of an implied covenant or condition constitutes no ground of
forfeiture does not conflict with any actual decision of this court. It is at
variance with an obiter dictum found in Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78
W. Va. 433; but that case involved no claim or question of forfeiture. It
was a mere action for damages for failure to drill wells. The observation
was made only argumentatively, in the course of interpretation of the lease
involved, and was not essential to the conclusion arrived at and announced.
It would have sufficed to say a demand for the drilling of off-set wells was
a prerequisite to a right of action for damages, instead of a condition precedent to right of forfeiture. On the other hand, the observation may be correct and yet not inconsistent with the position taken here in conformity-with
previous actual decisions. Denomination thereof as a mere dictum is all that
the present situation requires."
Carbon Black Co. v. Gillespie, supra n. 12,
468.
"89 W. Va. 138, 108 S. E. 889 (1921).
The court does not mention the Carper case, but it explains carefully
the difference in this case from the usual fraudulent drainage case, and
characterizes this case as "one of necessity and extreme hardship". Lamp
v. Locke, supra n. 14, 147.
" 93 W. Va. 646, 656, 117 S. E. 900 (1923).
1'169 S. E. 529 (W. Va. 1933).
" 173 S. E, 573 (W. Va, 1934).
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ing that where there is fraudulent drainage, the lessee is not estopped from suing for specific performance of the implied
"covenant" to "off-set drainage" by his acceptance of delay
rentals, or of royalties in the Dillard case."' And besides this
group of West Virginia cases, it is interesting to notice that there
are cases from almost all of the other leading oil fields of the
country which cite the Carper case as the leading precedent on
the implied duties of oil and gas lessee, and approve and follow
its doctrine."
In concluding this discussion which brings the Carper case
down to date, it is submitted that the doctrine which the case has
made so widespread is a sound doctrine and accomplishes a
,alutary result for the normal situation that exists in the great oil
and gas fields of the country, especially in so far as it tends to
minimize over-production, and especially in its application to the
gas industry. It is further submitted, however, that the wisdom of
applying the doctrine too freely in the West Virginia oil cases
because of the peculiar situation in the West Virginia oil fields,
may be doubted, if it tends to limit production of the remarkably
pure Pennsylvania crude oil.

-Tuxy

M. PETERS.

"'Some of these later cases use the term "covenant"
loosely again. For
a discussion of the Trimble case, see Note (1933) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 72. Also
see Note (1929). 7 TEX. L. Rsv 438, 440, 441, showing an anticipation of the
Trimble doctrine.
In Arkansas there is the case of Blair v. Clear Creek Oil and Gas Co.,
148 Ark. 301, 230 S. W. 286 (1921), 19 A. L. R. 438 (1922), which cites the
Carper case, and "quotes with approval" from it, but which is distinguished
from it on the facts. Then in Kentucky there is a line of decisions which
recognize that the principle of the Carper case is the currently accepted
authority, and they enunciate that principle and follow it: Warren Oil &
Gas Co. v. Gilliam, 182 Ky. 807, 207 S. W. 698 (1919); Plumber v. Southern
Oil Co., 185 Ky. 243, 214 S. W. 896 (1919); McNutt v. Whitney, 192 Ky.
132, 232 S. W. 386 (1921); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Howell, 199 Ky. 763, 251 S.
W. 1007 (1923). From Louisiana come two recent cases upholding the Carper case: McCoy v. State Line Oil & Gas Co., 175 La. 231, 143 So. 58 (1932),
and Lindow v. Southern Carbon Co., 5 F. Supp. 818 (W. D. La. 1932), the
latter decision being based entirely upon the Carper case and its companion
West Virginia cases and commending elaborately the principles of justice as
laid down by the West Virginia Supreme Court. Then the Oklahoma case of
Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 Pac. 104 (1918) is a leading
case in the field, and it is directly founded upon the West Virginia precedent, citing the Carper case and following its principles. The Carper case
is also cited in the cases from Oklahoma of Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel,
71 Okla. 142, 175 Pac. 92 (1918). and Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 P. (2d) 59
(C. C. A. 10th, 1930). And in the Tennessee decision of Morris v. Messer,
156 Tenn. 54, 299 S. W. 782 (1927) the West Virginia cases are generally
referred to and their principle followed.
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